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				<title><![CDATA[The Indiana Law Journal &amp; The Indiana Law Journal Supplement - Articles - Volume 82, Issue 2]]></title>
				<link>http://www.indianalawjournal.org</link>
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				<language>en-us</language>
				<copyright><![CDATA[http://www.indianalawjournal.org]]></copyright>
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					  <title><![CDATA[Not Just “Every Man”: Revisiting the Journalist’s Privilege Against Compelled Disclosure of Confidential Sources]]></title>
					  <link>http://www.indianalawjournal.org/articles/23/1/Not-Just-aEvery-Mana-Revisiting-the-Journalistas-Privilege-Against-Compelled-Disclosure-of-Confidential-Sources/Page1.html</link>
					  <description><![CDATA[

<p>The press
has long relied on confidential sources to inform the public about the issues
of the day, particularly those that are "highly charged." Without the ability
to grant confidentiality to sources, journalists would be stymied in their
investigative efforts and in gaining access to information that the public
would not otherwise be privy to. Yet in recent years, the press's newsgathering
ability has come under attack by federal prosecutors seeking compelled
disclosure of confidential sources, particularly in the grand jury setting.
This Note thus begins with the premise that the privilege of journalists
against compelled disclosure of confidential sources must be strengthened.
Doing so will enable the press to adequately perform its intended function, one
that is vital to the health of our democracy: keeping the public informed.</p>



<span>More specifically, this Note traces the legal
foundations on which the journalist's privilege is based, beginning with the
Supreme Court's seminal holding in <i>Branzburg
v. Hayes</i>, which precludes journalists from using the First Amendment as a
basis for protecting confidential sources. However, there exist two
alternatives for such protection: Federal Rule of Evidence 501 and statutory
law. This Note examines both possibilities and concludes that a federal shield
law is the proper means for providing journalists with protection against
compelled disclosure of confidential sources. A thoughtfully crafted statute
will both adequately balance the journalist's privilege against the competing
interest in the administration of justice, while also promoting the same
democratic values that are inherent in the First Amendment.</span>]]></description>
					  <author>no@spam.com (Jamie M. Porter)</author>
					  <pubDate>Thu, 04 Oct 2007 21:22:37 EDT</pubDate>
					 <guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.indianalawjournal.org/articles/23/1/Not-Just-aEvery-Mana-Revisiting-the-Journalistas-Privilege-Against-Compelled-Disclosure-of-Confidential-Sources/Page1.html</guid>
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					  <title><![CDATA[Simon Says: Time for a New Approach to Choice-of-Law Questions in Indiana]]></title>
					  <link>http://www.indianalawjournal.org/articles/22/1/Simon-Says-Time-for-a-New-Approach-to-Choice-of-Law-Questions-in-Indiana/Page1.html</link>
					  <description><![CDATA[<span>In <i>Simon
v. United States</i>, the Indiana Supreme Court was asked to answer certified
questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
pertaining to the application of Indiana
choice-of-law doctrine to a dispute under the Federal Tort Claims Act.Although <i>Simon
</i>presented the court with an opportunity to clarify its choice-of-law
doctrine, the court failed to take advantage of this promising
opportunity.The court emphatically
rejected central tenets of modern choice-of-law doctrine, including
governmental interest analysis, without offering any viable alternative for
evaluating the relative importance of state contacts in resolving choice-of-law
questions.In addition, the court
misapplied the so-called "conduct-regulating exception" to determine that Indiana law should
govern all substantive issues in the case.The court's puzzling rejection of modern doctrine leaves Indiana choice-of-law
doctrine without a coherent methodology for performing the central function of
any choice-of-law approach:determining
the relative importance of state contacts in a dispute involving connections to
multiple states.</span> ]]></description>
					  <author>no@spam.com (Eric J. McKeown)</author>
					  <pubDate>Thu, 04 Oct 2007 21:19:52 EDT</pubDate>
					 <guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.indianalawjournal.org/articles/22/1/Simon-Says-Time-for-a-New-Approach-to-Choice-of-Law-Questions-in-Indiana/Page1.html</guid>
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					  <title><![CDATA[Constitutional Challenges to Indiana’s Third-Party Custody Statutes]]></title>
					  <link>http://www.indianalawjournal.org/articles/21/1/Constitutional-Challenges-to-Indianaas-Third-Party-Custody-Statutes/Page1.html</link>
					  <description><![CDATA[<span>As American families change, individuals other
than parents often fulfill traditional parenting roles. To assist these
third-party caregivers, Indiana enacted statutes which allow for third-party
custody and visitation. These statutes&#8212;though intended for good&#8212;allow the
possibility of third-party infringement on the liberty interest of parents in
the care, custody, and control of their children. This Note examines the
development of the parental liberty interest, discusses how Indiana's statutes
threaten the parental interest, and proposes solutions that would protect the
parental interest while providing third parties the ability to obtain child
custody and visitation when necessary.</span> ]]></description>
					  <author>no@spam.com (Kristen H. Fowler)</author>
					  <pubDate>Thu, 04 Oct 2007 21:07:24 EDT</pubDate>
					 <guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.indianalawjournal.org/articles/21/1/Constitutional-Challenges-to-Indianaas-Third-Party-Custody-Statutes/Page1.html</guid>
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					  <title><![CDATA[Independent Adjudication, Political Process, and the State of Labor-Management Relations: The Role of the National Labor Relations Board]]></title>
					  <link>http://www.indianalawjournal.org/articles/20/1/Independent-Adjudication-Political-Process-and-the-State-of-Labor-Management-Relations-The-Role-of-the-National-Labor-Relations-Board/Page1.html</link>
					  <description><![CDATA[<span>This Article is based upon the inaugural William
R. Stewart Lecture given at Indiana University School of Law&#8211;Bloomington on
October 31, 2006.</span> ]]></description>
					  <author>no@spam.com (William B. Gould IV)</author>
					  <pubDate>Thu, 04 Oct 2007 20:36:05 EDT</pubDate>
					 <guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.indianalawjournal.org/articles/20/1/Independent-Adjudication-Political-Process-and-the-State-of-Labor-Management-Relations-The-Role-of-the-National-Labor-Relations-Board/Page1.html</guid>
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					  <title><![CDATA[Introduction to the Stewart Lecture Series]]></title>
					  <link>http://www.indianalawjournal.org/articles/19/1/Introduction-to-the-Stewart-Lecture-Series/Page1.html</link>
					  <description><![CDATA[<span>Introduction to the </span>inaugural <span>William R. Stewart Lecture on Labor and
Employment Law. </span>The lecture is the first in an annual
series in honor of William R. Stewart, a distinguished alumnus of Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington.&nbsp; ]]></description>
					  <author>no@spam.com (Lauren K. Robel)</author>
					  <pubDate>Thu, 04 Oct 2007 20:10:24 EDT</pubDate>
					 <guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.indianalawjournal.org/articles/19/1/Introduction-to-the-Stewart-Lecture-Series/Page1.html</guid>
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					  <title><![CDATA[Memorial to William R. Stewart]]></title>
					  <link>http://www.indianalawjournal.org/articles/18/1/Memorial-to-William-R-Stewart/Page1.html</link>
					  <description><![CDATA[

<p>For the many who knew him or had some contact with him&#8212;and
most especially for those many who loved him&#8212;William Rufus Stewart incorporated
many characteristics in that multidimensional personality of his. Two features
override all of them&#8212;his commitment to excellence&#8212;this is what prompted
President Bill Clinton to characterize his contributions to the NLRB as
"unparalleled"&#8212;and his compassion for humanity and life. </p>

 ]]></description>
					  <author>no@spam.com (William B. Gould IV)</author>
					  <pubDate>Thu, 04 Oct 2007 19:58:44 EDT</pubDate>
					 <guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.indianalawjournal.org/articles/18/1/Memorial-to-William-R-Stewart/Page1.html</guid>
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					  <title><![CDATA[Rethinking Criminal Corporate Liability]]></title>
					  <link>http://www.indianalawjournal.org/articles/16/1/Rethinking-Criminal-Corporate-Liability/Page1.html</link>
					  <description><![CDATA[

<p>Under current federal law a corporation, no matter how large
or small, is criminally liable if a member of the organization commits a crime
at least in part with the motive to benefit the company.This Article challenges that doctrine and
contends that where it seeks to charge a corporation as a defendant, the
government should bear the burden of establishing as an additional element that
the corporation failed to have reasonably effective policies and procedures to
prevent the conduct.This Article
demonstrates, though an examination of post-Enron deferred prosecution agreements,
that the government has consistently sought corporate reforms regarding
internal compliance measures that can best prevent and detect the crimes
engaged in by company employees.Those
agreements provide the measure of what the government views as appropriate
corporate behavior and provide a template for corporations seeking to implement
internal mechanisms that will satisfy law enforcement.Far from giving corporations a shield to commit
fraud, a system that ties criminal liability to the lack of an effective
compliance program will do what the practical limitations on a prosecutor's
time and resources could never permit &#8211; incentivize boardrooms around the
country to devise, implement, and monitor compliance measures. </p>

]]></description>
					  <author>no@spam.com (Andrew Weissman with David Newman)</author>
					  <pubDate>Wed, 03 Oct 2007 22:01:29 EDT</pubDate>
					 <guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.indianalawjournal.org/articles/16/1/Rethinking-Criminal-Corporate-Liability/Page1.html</guid>
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					  <title><![CDATA[Reconciling the Harvard and Chicago Schools: A New Antitrust Approach For the 21st Century]]></title>
					  <link>http://www.indianalawjournal.org/articles/15/1/Reconciling-the-Harvard-and-Chicago-Schools-A-New-Antitrust-Approach-For-the-21st-Century/Page1.html</link>
					  <description><![CDATA[

<p>For the past forty years, the economic theories of the
"Harvard" and "Chicago" Schools have battled for dominance in the federal
courts and antitrust enforcement agencies. In its 1999 decision in California
Dental Assoc. v. FTC, 526 U.S. 759 (1999), the Supreme Court cited Mr. Piraino
in recognizing a new antitrust approach that holds the promise for reconciling
the opposing theories of the Harvard and Chicago Schools. Building on the
Supreme Court's decision in California Dental, this Article proposes a new,
comprehensive approach for the antitrust analysis of all the principal types of
competitive conduct engaged in by American business. </p>

 ]]></description>
					  <author>no@spam.com (Thomas A. Piraino, Jr.)</author>
					  <pubDate>Wed, 03 Oct 2007 21:58:34 EDT</pubDate>
					 <guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.indianalawjournal.org/articles/15/1/Reconciling-the-Harvard-and-Chicago-Schools-A-New-Antitrust-Approach-For-the-21st-Century/Page1.html</guid>
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					  <title><![CDATA[Of Rules and Standards: Reconciling Statutory Limitations On &quot;Arising Under&quot; Jurisdiction]]></title>
					  <link>http://www.indianalawjournal.org/articles/14/1/Of-Rules-and-Standards-Reconciling-Statutory-Limitations-On-quotArising-Underquot-Jurisdiction/Page1.html</link>
					  <description><![CDATA[

<p>Article III authorizes and the Judicial Code grants federal
subject matter jurisdiction over civil cases "arising under" federal law.The Supreme Court has interpreted these words
differently, however, in their constitutional and statutory contexts. While the
constitutional text is read broadly, the Court has imposed three limitations on
the same words in the statutory grants of federal question jurisdiction:(1) the "well-pleaded complaint" rule, (2) a
requirement that the federal issues be sufficiently "direct" or "central" to
the dispute to justify access to the federal courts and (3) a requirement that
the federal assertion be "substantial." Our primary focus is the second
limitation &#8211; the centrality requirement &#8211; which has long vexed courts and commentators.In <i>Grable
& Sons Metal Products v. Darue Engineering</i>, the Court embraces the
broader view of federal question jurisdiction and finally provides meaningful
guidance for assessing when state-created claims may invoke federal question
jurisdiction.</p>



<p>In my opinion, the Court does this by implicitly recognizing
the difference between a rule and a standard.A rule affords the decision-maker no discretion, but cabins its inquiry
to whether a given set of facts exists. A standard, in contrast, affords the
decision-maker greater discretion by prescribing a series of relevant factors
to be weighed in view of a policy goal. In illuminating the difference, we
benefit by juxtaposing the centrality requirement with the well-pleaded
complaint rule.The latter performs a
task well-suited to a rule &#8211; it asks a question that can be answered "yes" or
"no."The centrality requirement,
however, asks a fundamentally different kind of question &#8211; essentially "how
much" federal content is required to invoke jurisdiction. This sort of question cries out for assessment
by a less determinate standard, which requires the court to balance federal and
state interests and to consider, among other things, litigation reality &#8211; that
is, what issues must be resolved in adjudicating the underlying dispute.</p>

 ]]></description>
					  <author>no@spam.com (Richard D. Freer)</author>
					  <pubDate>Wed, 03 Oct 2007 21:47:45 EDT</pubDate>
					 <guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.indianalawjournal.org/articles/14/1/Of-Rules-and-Standards-Reconciling-Statutory-Limitations-On-quotArising-Underquot-Jurisdiction/Page1.html</guid>
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					  <title><![CDATA[On Virtual Worlds: Copyright and Contract Law at the Dawn of the Virtual Age]]></title>
					  <link>http://www.indianalawjournal.org/articles/13/1/On-Virtual-Worlds-Copyright-and-Contract-Law-at-the-Dawn-of-the-Virtual-Age/Page1.html</link>
					  <description><![CDATA[

<p>In this article, the author examines the use of copyright
law on the internet &#8211; specifically in "virtual worlds" such as those in online
games such as World of Warcraft and EverQuest. These games have hundreds of
thousands of players world-wide, and many players "create" virtual goods,
artwork, and literary pieces while in the "world" of the games. </p>



<p>The author argues that because of the huge economies of
these popular games, courts will very soon have to address the application of
copyright law to the things that players create while in the virtual
environments. The author ultimately concludes that existing copyright law must
be modified in order to protect more fully the interests both of the game
creators and of the game players.</p>

 ]]></description>
					  <author>no@spam.com (Erez Reuveni)</author>
					  <pubDate>Wed, 03 Oct 2007 21:44:29 EDT</pubDate>
					 <guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.indianalawjournal.org/articles/13/1/On-Virtual-Worlds-Copyright-and-Contract-Law-at-the-Dawn-of-the-Virtual-Age/Page1.html</guid>
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